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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Driving to see her boyfriend one clear October day, Carla Correa approached a 
Baltimore intersection in her Honda Civic.  As she approached, the light turned 
yellow, and Correa quickly slammed on her brakes.  Moments later, a large truck 
rear-ended her, completely wrecking her Civic.  Why would Correa choose to stop so 
quickly instead of simply coasting through the yellow light?  The answer lies in a 
tiny box perched on a post above the intersection.  Inside the box is the dark 
omnipresent lens of a red-light camera, watching over the intersection like the 
proverbial “Big Brother.”  Correa explained that the intersection had a “quick yellow 
light” and “when [she] saw the yellow, [she] freaked out.”1  She stated, “Everytime I 
see the red-light camera, I’m terrified by it.”2   
 It appears that attitudes and fears like Ms. Correa’s are prevalent among the 
nation’s drivers.  A Washington Post study reported that the amount of traffic 
accidents increased at red-light intersections in the nation’s capital.3  The study also 
found that crashes resulting in injuries and fatalities had increased by 81% after 
installing red-light cameras at an intersection.4  Although camera proponents tout 
their safety benefits, the real purpose is often revenue based.  When a municipality 
chooses to issue tickets with the goal of generating revenue, what stops 
municipalities and the companies they contract with from issuing as many tickets as 
possible without safeguarding the rights of citizens? 
While the example above took place in Maryland, the same types of traffic 
cameras are being used in the City of Cleveland.  In fact, when former Mayor Jane 
Campbell proposed that the City of Cleveland install red-light cameras, she saw them 
as a way to close a serious budget gap.5  In 2004, Cleveland was confronted with the 
largest general fund deficit in over twenty years.6  While some measures were made 
to decrease spending, new sources of revenue were needed to close the deficit.7  It 
was in response to this deficit, that Mayor Campbell proposed the use of red-light 
                                                                
1Jonathan Miller, With Cameras on the Corner, Your Ticket is in the Mail, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 6, 2005, at G1. 
2Id. 
3Del Quentin Wilber & Derek Willis, D.C. Red-Light Cameras Fail to Reduce Accidents, 
WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1. 
4Id. 
5Id. 
6CITY OF CLEVELAND, 2005 BUDGET BOOK 1 (2005) (noting that a lagging economy, utility 
increases, soaring health care costs, and increase in the wages paid to labor contributed to this 
deficit).  In response, the mayor took an $11,000 reduction in salary and greatly reduced 
general fund spending.  Id.  However, the city’s finances remained strained and new sources of 
revenue were needed.  Id.   
7See generally id. 
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and speeding cameras.8  As Campbell noted in the city’s 2005 budget, “[t]hroughout 
the country, cities with red-light cameras raised significant dollars even in the first 
year of operation.”9  She predicted that in the first year of operation, the cameras 
would net the city $6.5 million.10  However, the proposal was met with skepticism by 
both city council members and residents.11  Councilman Kevin Conwell suggested 
that the mayor was more concerned about raising revenue that making the streets 
safer for drivers.12  Councilman Joe Cimperman harshly criticized the camera plan, 
stating “[m]aybe we should worry about real economic development rather than 
nickel and diming commuters.”13   
The Ohio Constitution establishes the principle of home rule, which allows 
municipalities to “exercise all powers of local self-government.”14  Under this power, 
municipalities have the power to pass ordinances that regulate citizens’ behavior.15  
However, as the Ohio Supreme Court has established, home rule is violated when a 
municipal ordinance conflicts with a general law of the Ohio Revised Code.16  The 
Ohio Revised Code contains a comprehensive system of traffic laws and establishes 
that violations of those laws are criminal offenses.17  Cleveland’s ordinance enforces 
speeding and red-light violations as civil offenses.18  Therefore, under the body of 
law established by the Supreme Court, Cleveland’s ordinance conflicts with the Ohio 
Revised Code.19  This Note argues that Cleveland’s traffic cameras violate the Home 
Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, because they enforce traffic violations 
civilly while the Ohio Revised Code treats the violations as crimes.   
Part II of this paper describes the history and development of traffic cameras.  It 
includes a discussion of how the two systems used by Cleveland (red-light and 
speeding cameras) operate.  It also gives a general background of the relationship 
between cities and camera vendors.  Part III provides the legal background of traffic 
cameras.  It begins by examining the various arguments that have been leveled 
against cameras and then examines the litigation to date challenging traffic cameras.  
Next, this Note discusses the scholarly literature on the subject and explains how this 
argument situates itself in the debate.  Part IV gives traffic law background by 
examining the Ohio Revised Code’s traffic law and the City of Cleveland’s traffic 
                                                                
8Id. at 3. 
9Id. 
10Mike Tobin, Controversy Flashes over Red-light Cameras: Q&A on Campbell’s Plan 
for Cleveland, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 4, 2005, at A1. 
11Id. 
12Id. Conwell stated that “[i]t sounds like they have a quota to meet for the budget.”  Id. 
13Id. 
14OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. 
15Id. 
16See discussion infra Part V.B1. 
17See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
18See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
19See discussion infra Part V. 
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camera ordinance.  It then discusses the Ohio Legislature’s involvement with traffic 
cameras and explains the recent passage and veto of House Bill 56.  Next, this Note 
explains the current situation in the Ohio courts and the recent certification of the 
constitutionality of traffic cameras to the Ohio Supreme Court.  Part V discusses 
Ohio’s Home Rule law.  It examines the key cases decided by the Ohio Supreme 
Court and explains the test for conflict between a municipal ordinance and state law.  
It then advances the argument that Cleveland’s traffic cameras violate the Ohio 
Constitution.  Finally, Part VI concludes and calls for the Ohio Supreme Court to 
find traffic cameras in conflict with the Ohio Revised Code.   
II.  HISTORY OF CAMERAS AND HOW THEY WORK 
A.  Red-light Cameras 
One type of traffic camera used by the City of Cleveland is commonly referred to 
as a red-light camera.  While red-light cameras are relatively new to the United 
States, other countries have used them for more than thirty-five years and they 
currently operate in more than forty-five countries.20  Red-light cameras first 
appeared in the United States in New York City in 1993.21  The cameras immediately 
generated a great deal of citations.22  Amazingly, New York City has issued 1.4 
million citations with only 7,000 of these citations resulting in a finding of not 
guilty.23  Today, the cameras are used in more than one hundred cities and do not 
appear to be going away soon, given their tremendous revenue potential.24 
Red-light cameras require the integration of three separate mechanisms: a 
camera, a trigger, and a computer.  At a typical red-light camera intersection, the 
cameras are mounted a few yards above the ground at each corner of the intersection.  
The triggers are buried below the asphalt and utilize induction loop technology.  One 
trigger is located at the stop bar, while the other trigger is typically located in the 
middle of the intersection.  The induction loop triggers create a magnetic field that 
determines when a vehicle has entered the intersection.  The computer is wired to 
both the triggers and the cameras.  When the traffic light is green or yellow, the 
computer ignores cars passing over the triggers.  Once the light turns red, the system 
photographs vehicles passing through the triggers at a given speed.  Vehicles must 
reach a pre-programmed speed so that the cameras do not photograph cars that are 
                                                                
20THE NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO STOP RED LIGHT RUNNING, A GUIDE TO RED LIGHT 
CAMERA PROGRAMS: STOP ON RED = SAFE ON GREEN 9 (2002), 
http://www.stopredlightrunning.com/pdfs/StopOnRedSafeOnGreen.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL 
CAMPAIGN]. 
21Id. 
22Id. (explaining that New York City issued 168,479 tickets from just fifteen cameras in 
the year following their introduction). 
23Id. 
24Laura Parker, Some Seeing Red over Red-Light Tickets, U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 18, 2006, at 
3A. 
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slowly inching through the intersection in order to make a valid right turn on the red 
light.25 
Once the system is activated, the camera takes two pictures.26  The first picture 
shows the vehicle before it enters the intersection and includes the stop bar or 
crosswalk.27  The second picture shows the vehicle in the intersection while the light 
is red.28  Most jurisdictions simply require that the cameras photograph the rear of 
the vehicle and must include the license plate.  Other jurisdictions require that a third 
picture be taken showing the face of the driver.  The cameras record the date of the 
incident, time of the infraction and speed of the vehicle.  Next, the photographs are 
reviewed by police officers and tickets are mailed out to the vehicle’s registered 
owner.29     
B.  Speed Cameras 
The second type of camera enforcement technology used by the City of 
Cleveland is photo speed enforcement systems or speed cameras.30  The first reported 
use of this technology was in Germany in May 1973 on the Autobahn.31  By 2005, 
speed enforcement systems were being used in at least seventy-five countries.32  
Although their use in America is relatively limited compared to other countries, the 
cameras are currently employed by a number of communities in several states and in 
Washington D.C.33  However, the use of speed cameras in the United States is 
rapidly increasing due to their ability to raise large amounts of revenue for 
communities.34 
Automated speed enforcement systems require the interaction of three elements: 
a Vehicle Speed Subsystem, a Vehicle/Driver Photo Subsystem, and a Speeding 
Violation Subsystem.  Two common varieties of Vehicle Speed Subsystems are in 
use.  One type of system uses a Lidar sensor, relying on radar technology.  The 
system emits energy to create an electromagnetic field that is able to sense a vehicle's 
                                                                
25See Tom Harris, How Red-Light Cameras Work, http://auto.howstuffworks.com/red-
light-camera.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2006). 
26NATIONAL CAMPAIGN, supra note 20, at 11. 
27Id. 
28Id. at 12. 
29Id. 
30See generally ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, FINAL REPORT 596, 
TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF PHOTO SPEED ENFORCEMENT FOR FREEWAYS 11 (2005), available 
at http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/05-scottsdale.pdf [hereinafter ADOT REPORT]. 
31Id. (stating that speed cameras were installed between Cologne and Frankfurt on 
Autobahn A3). 
32Id.  (including Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and Taiwan). 
33Id. (including Arizona, California, Colorado, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and the 
District of Columbia). 
34Id. 
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speed.35  Other vendors utilize Piezo sensors, which are buried under the pavement 
and require a vehicle to pass over them in order to determine the vehicle's speed.36  
Two sensors are located a short distance apart and a vehicle's speed is calculated 
based on the time it takes to travel between them.37 
Once a sensor determines the vehicle’s speed, the system must then compare this 
speed to the threshold speed set by the camera operator.38  The threshold speed is the 
speed at which a violation occurs and is determined by the municipality using the 
camera.39  For instance, if the speed limit is thirty-five miles per hour, a municipality 
might set the threshold speed at forty or forty-five miles per hour.40  Once the 
threshold speed is met, the vehicle is determined to be speeding, and the 
Vehicle/Driver Photo Subsystem is activated and a photograph is taken.41  
While early systems used film cameras, today, photo enforcement technology 
utilizes digital cameras to record a speeding infraction.42  Typically, a photograph is 
only taken if a vehicle is determined to be speeding.43  Like red-light cameras, the 
photograph records important information such as the date of the incident and the 
speed of the vehicle.44  In order to protect against privacy and tampering concerns, 
most vendors encrypt the data once it has been recorded.45  The laws of the 
municipality or state in which the system is located dictate the number of 
photographs taken.  While some areas require that only the license plate of the 
vehicle is taken, others require both a picture of the license plate and of the driver of 
the vehicle.46  In order to obtain the best images, the cameras require illumination.47  
These flash systems must provide sufficient illumination to ensure that a clear 
photograph is produced in rainy weather or at night.48  Since the flash must be 
                                                                
35Id. 
36Id. at 12-13. 
37Id. at 13. 
38Id. at 14. 
39Id. 
40See generally id. 
41Id. 
42Id.   
43Id.   
44Id.   
45Id.   
46See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
47ADOT REPORT, supra note 30, at 15 (stating that the illumination is typically provided 
by  “a flash tube and optimized lamp reflector”). 
48Id. (explaining that the flash system must be able to provide sufficient illumination in 
any light or weather condition). 
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sufficiently bright and located close to the vehicle or driver, many citizens are 
concerned that they may result in a temporary loss of control over the vehicle.49 
The final component, the Speeding Violation Subsystem, is the administrative 
component and varies widely depending on the jurisdiction that the speed camera is 
located in.50 It is also the system that is subject to the greatest amount of criticism, as 
discussed later in this Note.51  Very generally, it requires a reviewing officer to 
identify the driver or vehicle owner and issue a citation, and affords defendants some 
judicial or administrative review.52 
C.  Relationship between Municipalities and Camera Vendors 
Perhaps the biggest problem with traffic cameras is the relationship between the 
cities and the companies that install and maintain the cameras and issue the 
citations.53  While camera proponents often tout the safety benefits of cameras,54 the 
evidence strongly suggests that many municipalities use them to generate revenue.55  
One commentator noted that a North Carolina red-light statute “sought to generate 
revenue rather than to promote public safety because the standard for issuing a ticket 
has been effectively lowered, making it easier to collect money.”56  In fact, studies 
show that red-light cameras may actually increase accidents.57  Municipalities are 
publicly promoting the supposed safety benefits of cameras, while obscuring their 
real goal of revenue generation.   
Contracts between camera vendors and municipalities are usually fee based, 
paying vendors per ticket issued.  In Toledo, the vendor Redflex keeps 75% of the 
money generated by the tickets.58  The per-ticket fee arrangement benefits both the 
municipality and the vendor.  According to the city manager of Berkeley, California, 
the city would not be able to afford the red-light cameras if it were required to lease 
                                                                
49Id. (“Many citizens are concerned about frontal flash and may claim that it is unsafe to 
expose a driver to such a bright light.”). 
50See generally id. at 16. 
51See discussion infra Part III.A. 
52ADOT REPORT, supra note 30, at 16 (stating that the vehicle's owner is identified 
through the state's license plate records and issued a citation). 
53See, e.g., Jim Provance, Taft to Consider Red-light Camera Bill: New Law would Place 
Restrictions on the Traffic Enforcement Devices, TOLEDO BLADE, Dec. 13, 2006. 
54See, e.g., Wilber & Willis, supra note 3, at A1 (stating that Washington D.C. officials 
credit red-light cameras for making roads safer).   
55Editorial, When Revenue Trumps Safety in D.C., WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2005, at A12 
(explaining that Washington D.C. Mayor Tony Williams sought renewal of the city’s red-light 
contract to maintain the collection of revenue, and made no mention of increasing road safety). 
56Andrew W.J. Tarr, Recent Development, Picture It: Red Light Cameras Abide by the 
Law of the Land, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1879, 1886 (2002). 
57Wilber & Willis, supra note 3, at A1. 
58Provance, supra note 53, at A1. 
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or buy the cameras and operate them.59  In St. Louis, the city receives two-thirds of 
each ticket issued and “can easily generate tens of thousands of dollars a year, all 
without having to put up any money.”60  Given the large amount of money to be 
gained, it is not surprising that competition for these contracts is fierce among red-
light camera vendors.61  This competition has the potential to corrupt government 
officials as evidenced by the forced resignation of the mayor of St. Peters, Missouri, 
who attempted to solicit a bribe from a camera vendor in exchange for the city’s 
business.62  The potential for corruption in the current process raises valid concerns. 
The City of Cleveland enacted its red-light camera ordinance on June 22, 2005.63  
The ordinance required that “[t]he program [] include a fair and sound ticket-
evaluation by the vendor and a police officer.”64  However, an article published 
shortly after the program went into effect found that in a two-week period, police 
officers had reviewed only 230 of the 700 photographs taken by the city’s red-light 
cameras.65  Common sense dictates that a fee based contract between city and vendor 
would tend to encourage the vendor to issue as many tickets as possible without 
ensuring due process and equal rights protections.66  While this proposition seems 
logical, as demonstrated below, the courts have not always agreed.67  While these 
types of relationships appear suspicious on their face, in order to have Cleveland’s 
cameras invalidated, it is necessary to demonstrate, as this Note does, that the 
cameras violate the Ohio Constitution. 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF TRAFFIC CAMERAS 
A.  Arguments against Cameras and Litigation Summary 
Red-light camera critics have asserted a variety of constitutional problems with 
automated enforcement programs.68  Some critics contend that the cameras violate 
equal protection because punishments differ between automated enforcement 
                                                                
59See Matthew Artz, Camera Company Gets Cut From Red Light Fees, BERKELEY DAILY 
PLANET, Apr. 22, 2005. 
60Jake Wagman, Lights, Camera, Traffic Ticket, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 2006, 
at A1. 
61See id. (explaining how camera vendors employ lobbyists and former government 
officials in order to win contracts). 
62Id. 
63Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 1183-05 (June 22, 2005). 
64Id. 
65See thenewspaper.com, Cleveland, Ohio Police Do Not Review Camera Tickets, 
http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/08/818.asp (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (stating that “more 
than one-half of the notices went out without any police review.”). 
66Id. 
67See infra Part III.A. 
68See, e.g., SHARI T. KENDALL, INSURANCE INSTITUTE FOR HIGHWAY SAFETY, IS 
AUTOMATED ENFORCEMENT CONSTITUTIONAL 1 (2004), http://www.iihs.org/laws/state_laws/ 
pdf/auto_enforce_paper.pdf. 
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violations and violations enforced by “on-the-spot” police officers.69  Others assert 
that municipal programs that boot vehicles when the owners fail to pay automated 
enforcement tickets constitute a taking under the Fifth Amendment.70  Critics who 
consider the violations an illegal search and seizure implicate the Fourth 
Amendment.71  Still others contend that automated enforcement programs are an 
unjustified invasion of privacy.72  However, the problems with this argument have 
been examined73 and one judge explained “[a]lthough cameras operated by the 
Government are a concern regarding privacy issues, those concerns are outweighed 
by the legitimate concerns of safety on our public streets.”74   
Other arguments against cameras raise due process concerns by examining the 
hearing process.  Since the vehicle’s owner is presumed guilty, challenging the ticket 
is extremely difficult.75  In Chicago, ninety percent of challenges fail because the city 
will accept only a handful of defenses.76  In explaining the difference between a 
camera violation and a ticket by a police officer, a commentator explained that “[a] 
camera-monitored violation may be proved by a mere preponderance of the 
evidence, but the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a[] [police officer 
cited] infraction was committed.”77  The evidence demonstrates that red-light tickets 
are extremely difficult to challenge and therefore critics contend that they violate due 
process because they do not ensure a fair and impartial hearing.78  Another argument 
against the use of red-light cameras is that the statutes authorizing them place the 
burden of proof on the defendant.79  For example, Cleveland’s ordinance states that 
                                                                
69Id. (noting that the County Court of Denver, Colorado has found the different 
punishments reasonable). 
70Id. at 2. 
71Id.  (explaining that a court upheld the practice of booting because it did not constitute a 
taking of the vehicle). 
72Id. at 2-3  (noting that the issue has never been raised in court because the Supreme 
Court has noted limited privacy in automobiles).  
73See Mary Lehman, Comment, Are Red Light Cameras Snapping Privacy Rights?, 33 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 815 (2002).  A person has a “lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile.”  Id. 
at 818.  Also, if an automobile is considered to be in plain view, it will fall under the plain 
view exception for warrantless searches.  Id. at 820.  Since automobiles rarely serve as an 
individual’s residence, they are subject to a lesser degree of privacy protection.  Id. at 828.  
Although the Supreme Court has not directly ruled on this issue, red light cameras seem to fall 
outside of the Fourth Amendment’s reach.  Id. at 828-29. 
74See Agomo v. Williams, No. 02-0006520, 2003 D.C. Super. LEXIS 31, 17 (D.C. Super. 
2003).   
75Monifa Thomas, Just Shut Up and Pay, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at 3. 
76Id. (stating that the registered owner must prove that the vehicle was leased to another 
person or stolen in order to win a challenge).   
77Tarr, supra note 56, at 1886.   
78Id. 
79See Riley v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:06CV619, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36127, 3-4 
(N.D. Ohio June 2, 2006). 
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“[t]he contents of the ticket shall constitute prima facie evidence of the facts it 
contains.”80  Plaintiffs around the country have alleged that red-light camera 
programs are unconstitutional because vehicle owners are ticketed whether or not it 
can be proved that they are driving.81   
In recent years there has been a wide expansion of traffic camera litigation.82  Of 
the existing cases, very few have examined the constitutionality of cameras as this 
Note does.  For example, one case challenged the District of Columbia statute on the 
grounds that the “provision on its face presumes that the owner of a vehicle was its 
driver at the time of the infraction.”83  The plaintiff alleged that he did not know who 
was driving his car at the time of the violation, and that because the driver could not 
be identified, the District of Columbia “impermissibly shifted the burden of proving 
the violation to him.”84  However, the court upheld the statute and granted the 
District’s motion for summary judgment.85 
The federal courts have skirted the question for the most part and avoided 
deciding the constitutionality of the cameras.86  In Dajani v. Maryland, the district 
court dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction, and did not reach the merits 
of the plaintiff’s constitutional claims.87  An Oregon appellate court also dismissed a 
case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his constitutional right to due 
process.88  In affirming the dismissal, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the district court 
properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to declare the defendant’s speeding 
conviction unconstitutional, grant him a new hearing, or compel the State of Oregon 
to refund his fine.”89  However, a North Carolina District Court did reach some of the 
constitutional issues of red-light cameras but held that the appellant lacked standing 
to challenge the statute.90  In addition, a lawsuit is currently pending in an Ohio 
federal court alleging “constitutional violations with respect to the burden of proof, 
                                                                
80Cleveland, Ohio, Ordinance 1183-05 (June 22, 2005). 
81Parker, supra note 24, at 3A. 
82See Parker, supra note 24, at 3A. 
83Agomo v. Williams, No. 02-0006520, 2003 D.C. Super. LEXIS 31, 17 (D.C. Super. June 
12, 2003).   
84Id. at 17-18. 
85Id. at 23. 
86See generally Dajani v. Maryland, No. Civ.CCB-00-713, 2001 WL 85181 (D. Md. Jan. 
24, 2001). 
87Id. 
88Holst v. City of Portland, No. CV-03-1330-ST, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9076, 19 (D. Or. 
May 14, 2004) (“Holst has identified no practice by the City of Portland regarding the 
procedures employed for processing photo radar speed violations that falls below 
constitutional due process minimums.”).   
89Holst v. City of Portland, 152 Fed. App'x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2005). 
90See Shavitz v. City of High Point, 270 F. Supp. 2d 702 (M.D.N.C. 2003).   
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the presentation of evidence, . . . and the Excessive Fine Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.”91 
Litigants challenging red-light cameras have had more success in state courts.  
Recently, a Minnesota appellate court held that the state’s photo-enforcement 
ordinance was “in conflict” with the Minnesota Highway Traffic Regulation Act.92  
While emphasizing that its decision “does not determine the general validity or 
invalidity of photo-enforcement of traffic violations,”93 the court interestingly noted 
a trend in legal challenges to red-light cameras.94  It stated that “the automated-
traffic-enforcement systems that have been upheld against legal challenges by 
vehicle owners are cases in which the state, rather than a local unit of government, 
enacted the vehicle-owner-liability legislation.”95  The question was appealed to the 
Minnesota Supreme Court, which affirmed the appellate court on April 5, 2007.96  
Other courts have dismissed convictions by determining that the evidence was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction.97  The Oregon Supreme Court dismissed a red-
light camera conviction because there was no witness available to identify the driver 
of the car and no evidence that the defendant owned the car.98  In addition, an Oregon 
appellate court recently held that the state’s speedy trial statute applied to camera 
citations, because the state law mandated that traffic violations were crimes and thus 
subject to the rules of criminal procedure.99  Since courts are reluctant to discuss the 
federal constitutionality of cameras, a challenge to Cleveland’s system will likely 
have to rely on state law as the preceding successful challenges have. 
B.  Scholarly Literature Overview 
The scholarly literature to date has found traffic cameras to be constitutional.  A 
law review article written by Mary Lehman focuses on the question of whether red- 
light cameras constitute an invasion of privacy or a valid restriction on liberty 
because running red lights is illegal and dangerous.100  Lehman argues that cameras 
only record information that is in plain view and that there is no expectation of 
privacy on a public street, and therefore, the cameras do not constitute an invasion of 
                                                                
91Riley v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:06 CV 619, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36127, 3-4 (N.D. 
Ohio June 2, 2006). 




96See State v. Kuhlman, 729 N.W.2d 577, 584 (Minn. 2007) (holding that the Minneapolis 
local ordinance conflicted with the state’s traffic laws).   
97See State v. Clay, 332 P.3d 1101, 1104 (Or. 2001). 
98Id. 
99State v. Greenlick, A127374, 2007 Ore. App. LEXIS 212, 10 (Or. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2007) 
(dismissing appellant’s camera citation because the state violated his right to a speedy trial).  
Id. at 10-11. 
100Lehman, supra note 73, at 815. 
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privacy.101  She contends that when offenders run a red light, they forego their right 
to privacy.102  Lehman discusses proposed alternatives to red-light cameras but 
refutes them and argues that the cameras are at least comparable but in most cases 
better solutions.103  She believes that opponents are too quick to condemn cameras by 
overlooking benefits because they are focused on their fear of too much government 
control.104    
An article by Steven Naumchik makes an argument in support of cameras based 
on safety.105  Naumchik says that “positive statistical results are undisputed” with 
respect to the efficiency of red-light cameras in ensuring safety.106  The article’s 
focus is on camera enforcement legislation in California, specifically a “three year 
demonstration program” enacted between 1995 and 1998.107   He also argues that 
California’s cameras do not violate “autonomy privacy” or “informational privacy,” 
which are components of the California state constitution.108  The author adds that a 
constitutional issue could arise if private information were improperly 
disseminated.109  He concludes the argument by insisting that the government has a 
valid interest in ensuring public welfare through enforcement of red lights and 
camera legislation will save more lives than it harms.110 
Since this debate is a relatively new one, the scholarly literature is somewhat 
limited.  All the law review articles written on the subject have argued that traffic 
cameras are constitutional.  No article has discussed the validity of Cleveland’s 
traffic cameras or of the home rule argument advanced by this Note.  The published 
literature tends to stress the safety benefits of traffic cameras.111  While the literature 
argues that cameras are important for ensuring safety, studies have shown that this is 
not always the case.112  Mainly, the debate has centered on the expectation of privacy 
under the U.S. Constitution.113  The articles have argued that the use of traffic 
                                                                
101Id. 
102Id. at 831. 
103Id. at 845. 
104Id.   
105Steven Tafoya Naumchik, Review of Selected 1998 California Legislation: 
Transportation and Motor Vehicles: Stop! Photographic Enforcement of Red Lights, 30 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 833, 834 (1999). 
106Id. at 851. 
107Id. at 833-34.  The statute was enacted on a temporary basis as an experiment, 
reevaluated three years later, and ultimately put in place permanently.  Id. at 838.  No 
constitutional or policy flaws were determined during the reevaluation process.  Id. 
108Id. at 841. 
109Id. 
110Id. 
111See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text. 
112See, e.g.. supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. 
113See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text. 
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cameras does not violate these constitutional provisions.114  The way that camera 
operators circumvent these constitutional issues is by enforcing the violations as civil 
instead of criminal penalties.115  However, this Note argues that the transformation of 
a criminal penalty at the state level to a civil penalty at the municipal level violates 
Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution.116   
IV.  TRAFFIC LAW BACKGROUND AND CURRENT SITUATION IN OHIO 
A.  Traffic Offenses under the Ohio Revised Code 
In order to show how Cleveland’s photo enforcement ordinance violates the 
Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution, a logical starting point is the Ohio 
Revised Code’s treatment of traffic offenses.  Section 4511.21 of the Ohio Revised 
Code (“O.R.C.”) defines speeding offenses under Ohio law.117  Ohio Revised Code  
§ 4511.21(A) provides, “[n]o person shall operate a motor vehicle . . . at a speed 
greater or less than is reasonable or proper . . . and . . . at a greater speed than will 
permit the person to bring it to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead.”118  
The section then goes on to list the different speed limits allowed on various types of 
thoroughfares, and makes it prima facie lawful “in the absence of a lower limit 
declared pursuant to this section by . . . local authorities” to travel at the enumerated 
speeds.119  The importance of this language is that although municipalities may under 
certain enumerated circumstances require vehicles to travel more slowly than 
mandated by statute, they may not allow vehicles in their localities to travel at speeds 
greater than the statute.  This suggests that the Ohio Legislature sought to enact a 
general ceiling on speed limits in the State.  Although they recognized that certain 
local conditions might require a slower speed of travel, they did not delegate to 
municipalities the police power to exceed these limits.  This leads to the inference 
that the Legislature wanted to ensure that its citizens remained safe when traveling 
on the State’s roads and did not trust municipalities with this important obligation.120  
The Ohio Supreme Court previously held as much with respect to Title 45 of the 
Ohio Revised Code.121 
                                                                
114See supra notes 100-110 and accompanying text. 
115See generally CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE 413.031 (2005) (stating that camera 
violations will be enforced civilly). 
116See discussion infra Part V. 
117OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21 (LEXISNEXIS 2006). 
118Id. 
119Id. § 4511.21(B) (emphasis added).  For instance, the statute sets a speed limit of twenty 
miles per hour in a school zone, twenty-five miles per hour in other portions of municipalities, 
thirty-five miles per hour on state routes, and sixty-five miles per hour on freeways.   
120Id.  
121City of Cleveland Heights v. Woodle, 198 N.E2d 68, 70 (Ohio 1964) (stating that 
section 4511.21 was enacted in order to provide uniform traffic rules throughout the state). 
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Ohio Revised Code § 4511.21(E) and (F) describe the procedures to be followed 
by police officers when charging a person with a violation of that section.122  These 
sections are meant to ensure proper service and notice.123  Notable in the language of 
the statute is the mention labeling of the alleged violator as the “defendant,” 
suggesting that these are criminal violations.124  Section 4511.21(G) requires that 
points be assessed for a violation of the statute according to the procedure outlined in 
section 4510.036.125  This requirement is aimed at keeping the roads safe by 
suspending the license of motorists who exhibit extremely reckless and unsafe 
driving habits.126   
Finally, O.R.C. § 4511.21(P) sets forth the criminal penalties for violations of the 
state’s traffic laws.127  A motorist’s first violation of the section results in a minor 
misdemeanor.  However, with each additional offense within a one-year period, the 
gravity of the crime increases.  Two violations result within a year result in a 
misdemeanor of the fourth degree, and so on.128  These statutes make clear the 
Legislature’s specific intention to treat speeding violations as criminal acts.  
Nowhere do the State’s extensive traffic statutes treat these violations as civil 
offense, and there is no delegation to municipalities of the power to decriminalize 
speeding offenses.   
B.  Traffic Violations under Cleveland’s Ordinance 
To illustrate just how great the conflict is between Cleveland’s traffic cameras 
and the Ohio Revised Code, it is useful to examine the Cleveland ordinance that 
allows photo enforcement.  The City of Cleveland’s traffic code permits civil 
enforcement of red-light and speeding violations.129  The city amended its traffic 
code on July 20, 2005 to allow for a “civil enforcement system for red-light and 
speeding offenders photographed by means of an ‘automated traffic enforcement 
camera system.’”130  Chapters 413.031(b) and 413.031(c) explain that the owner of 
the vehicle shall be liable for the penalty resulting from a red-light or speeding 
                                                                
122OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21(E) (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (“In every charge of violation 
of this section the affidavit and warrant shall specify the time, place, and speed at which the 
defendant is alleged to have driven.”).  See also id. § 4511.21(F) (stating that when a speed in 
excess of the limit is charged, the “defendant” must be charged in a “single affidavit, alleging 
a single act” with a violation of the law.   
123Id. § 4511.21(E)-(F). 
124Id. § 4511.21(E). 
125Id. § 4511.21(G). 
126See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.036 (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (explaining the 
points system and when a driver’s license will be suspended).  See also infra notes 265-67 and 
accompanying text.   
127OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21(P) (LEXISNEXIS 2006). 
128Id.  
129CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE 413.031 (2005) (“Use of Automated Cameras to 
Impose Civil Penalties upon Red Light and Speeding Violators.”). 
130Id. 413.031(a) (imposing monetary liability on red light running and speeding). 
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offense, respectively.131  Chapter 413.031(d) of the traffic code then states that “[t]he 
imposition of liability under this section shall not be deemed a conviction for any 
purpose and shall not be made part of the operating record of any person on whom 
the liability is imposed.”132 
Chapter 413.031(i) explains that a violation of the ordinance is a “noncriminal 
violation for which a civil penalty shall be assessed and for which no points . . . shall 
be assigned.”133  Finally, the ordinance states that it is prima facie evidence that the 
registered owner of the vehicle was the driver at the time of the incident.”134  The 
face of the ordinance represents a direct contrast with the traffic statutes of the Ohio 
Revised Code.135  The ordinance does nothing to ensure that unsafe drivers will be 
kept off the road.136  It has no procedural safeguards ensuring legitimate notice and 
service, and it places the burden on the vehicle’s owner to prove he did not commit 
the violation.137  The ordinance represents a complete departure from the treatment 
the Ohio Legislature decided to give traffic offenses in the Ohio Revised Code.138 
C.  Ohio House Bill 241 
The Ohio Revised Code is silent on the issue of whether municipalities may use 
red-light or speed cameras to enforce municipal traffic laws.139  The Ohio Legislature 
has attempted to address the issue twice, once by attempting to pass legislation 
allowing municipalities to use these cameras,140 and more recently, by passing 
legislation, later vetoed, which would have severely restricted their effectiveness.141  
House Bill 241 was proposed by Representative Robert Latta and sought to amend 
certain sections of the Ohio Revised Code to establish a “non-criminal enforcement 





135Compare CLEVELAND, OHIO, TRAFFIC CODE 413.031 (2005), with OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 4511.21 (LEXISNEXIS 2006). 
136See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
137See supra notes 133 and accompanying text. 
138See supra notes 117-28 and accompanying text. 
139See generally, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. (LexisNexis 2006) (Red light or speed cameras 
are not mentioned at all in the entire Ohio Revised Code).   
140See H.R. 241, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001) (introduced on May 2, 2001, 
this law was never passed by the Ohio General Assembly).   
141H.B. 56, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).  This bill passed the Ohio House 
on December 12, 2006.  See Joseph L. Wagner, New Law Puts City’s Traffic Cameras in 
Jeopardy, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Dec. 13, 2006, at A1.  However, just before leaving 
office, former Ohio Governor Bob Taft vetoed the legislation saying that it “unjustifiably 
eliminates the discretion of our locally elected and locally accountable officials in favor of a 
one-size-fits-all method with essentially unenforceable penalties.  See Reginald Fields, Taft 
Vetoes Bill to Stop Traffic Cameras; Cities Call it Victory for Home Rule, PLAIN DEALER 
(Cleveland), Jan. 6, 2007, at B1. 
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007
622 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:607 
mechanism” that would allow municipalities, counties, or townships to install red-
light cameras and issue tickets to drivers that ran red lights.142   
Under the bill, use of cameras would have been limited to counties with 
populations over 400,000.  The proposed bill sought to decriminalize red-light 
violations that were captured by the cameras, making them civil offenses.  It also 
would have allowed municipalities to set up traffic control signal violations bureaus 
that would hear appeals of tickets issued by the cameras.  The bill would have 
prohibited municipalities from entering into fee-based contracts with vendors that 
were contingent on the number of citations issued.143   However, the proposed bill 
never passed the Ohio House and did not become law.144 
D. Ohio House Bill 56 
Five years later, both chambers of the Ohio General Assembly did pass a bill that 
would have significantly curtailed the use of red-light and speed cameras in the state, 
only to have it vetoed by the outgoing governor.145  House Bill 56 sought to amend 
the Ohio Revised Code by creating sections 4511.092, 4511.093, and 4511.094.146  
Section 4511.092 would have prohibited municipalities wishing to use camera 
enforcement from entering into fee-based contracts that were contingent “upon the 
number of tickets issued or the amount of fines levied or collected by the local 
authority.”147  This would have insured that tickets were only issued for valid 
violations, because private companies would no longer enjoy monetary incentives to 
issue as many tickets as possible.148  Representative Jim Raussen, the Bill’s chief 
proponent, stated “why not put in tougher restrictions . . . [i]t’s too easy to issue 
tickets.”149   
                                                                
142H.R. 241, 124th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2001). 
143Id. 
144Although no source exists explicitly stating that the bill never passed, the author is 
inferring this from the fact that the Ohio Revised Code was never amended to authorize red 
light cameras.  The author also does not know the reasons why the bill did not pass, but he can 
speculate on a couple of possible reasons.  The easiest explanation is that the Legislature 
simply did not want to give municipalities the authority to use red light cameras.  Another 
plausible explanation is that camera vendors were extremely upset with the bill’s prohibition 
on contingency-based contracts.  Knowing that the bill would cost them a great deal of 
potential profits, it is possible that red light vendors successfully lobbied to have the bill killed 
in the house. 
145See James Cummings, Veto keeps the red-light cameras rolling: Gov. Taft Says Cities 
should be able to Enforce Traffic Laws as they see fit, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Jan. 6, 2007 at 
A4. 
146H.B. 56, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005). 
147Id. 
148See generally id.; see also Matthew Artz, Camera Company Gets Cut From Red Light 
Fees, BERKELEY DAILY PLANET, Apr. 22, 2005 (explaining that contingency fee contracts 
might give vendors an incentive to maximize the number of citations issued).    
149Provance, supra note 53 at A1.   
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The House Bill would still have allowed red-light violations, however it would 
have severely limited the ability of municipalities to issue speed violations.150  In 
order to do so, a police officer would have to witness the violation and write the 
ticket.151  It also protected against privacy concerns by forbidding the cameras from 
taking pictures of the automobile’s driver.152  In an effort to protect the due process 
rights of citizens, the law placed the burden of proving a violation on the state, a big 
change from the current system in which the burden is placed on the vehicle’s owner 
to prove that he or she did not commit the offense.153  The law required review of the 
photographs by a law enforcement officer and forbade municipalities from issuing 
tickets “in the name of a motor vehicle leasing dealer or motor vehicle renting 
dealer.”154  This was meant to insure that only the actual driver of the vehicle and not 
simply the registered owner of the vehicle would be cited.155 
The bill also addressed the conflict between the Ohio Revised Code’s criminal 
treatment of moving violations, and their civil treatment in traffic camera 
ordinances.156  The new law would have permitted municipalities to enforce camera 
violations as civil violations, and thus there would be no conflict between the state 
and local laws.157   
Section 4511.093 sought to establish “standards governing the use of traffic law 
photo-monitoring devices” in order to govern where the cameras could be installed 
and the necessary warning signs that would be erected.158  Finally, the proposed law 
                                                                
150H.B. 56, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005).  Section (B)(2) of the proposed 
code stated that a local authority “[s]hall use the devices for the enforcement of a qualified 
traffic violation and not for the purpose of enforcing other traffic laws, unless a law 
enforcement officer is present at the location of the device and issues the ticket at the time and 
location of the violation.” 
151Id. 
152Id. Section (B)(9) prohibited the “use of any such device to photograph, videotape, or 
produce a digital image of a vehicle operator for the purpose of determining whether a 
qualified traffic violation has occurred.”  Id. 
153Id.  Section (F)(1) required that “[t]he local authority shall have the burden of proving a 
contested violation by a preponderance of evidence.”  Id.  
154Id. 
155Id. 
156See Daniel Moadus, Jr., et al. v. City of Girard, No. 05-CV-1927, 6 (Ct. Com. Pl. 
Trumbull County July 6, 2006) (“[T]he Ordinance purports to simply override R.C. Sections 
4510.036 and 4511.21(G) with respect to the point system.  There is a public policy the State 
Legislature has implemented through the point system to take careless or reckless drivers off 
the roads.”; see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.036 (LexisNexis 2006) (stating that a court 
shall assess points to an offender’s driving record).  A speeding offense requires four points if 
the speed is more than thirty miles over the speed limit and two points for any other speeding 
offense.  Id. 
157H.B. 56, 126th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2005) (stating in section 4511.092 that 
these violations would not be considered a criminal offense and forbidding the assessment of 
points against an offender’s driving record). 
158Id.  (stating that the standards should be set by the department of transportation and 
requiring consultation with the local governments).   
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established a “legislative traffic law photo-enforcement study committee” to consist 
of three members of the Ohio Senate and three members of the Ohio House.159  The 
committee was charged with evaluating the use of photo-enforcement in Ohio and 
was to make recommendations as to the continued use of the technology in the 
state.160 
A year and a half after its introduction, the final version of the bill passed the 
Senate by a vote of eighteen to thirteen on December 12, 2006.161  In passing the bill, 
Senator Jeff Armbruster, the bill’s key advocate in the Senate called the cameras a 
“monstrous speed trap” and that their chief purpose was to raise revenue, not to 
improve safety.162  The bill passed the House on December 12, 2006 by a vote of 
sixty-six to twenty-eight and was sent to the Governor for his review.163  Cities 
around the State of Ohio immediately began lobbying the Governor to veto the 
bill.164  Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson stated that the bill demonstrated the Ohio 
Legislature’s “anti-urban agenda” and that it “discriminates against Cleveland, 
interferes with our right to enter into contracts and our right to self-governance.”165  
Conspicuously absent from the pleas of officials in several cities around the state, 
was any mention of the safety that the cameras bring to the communities.166   
On January 5, 2007, his last day in office, Governor Taft vetoed the bill.167  He 
argued that the bill “unjustifiably eliminates the discretion of our locally elected and 
locally accountable officials in favor of a one-size-fits-all method with essentially 
unenforceable penalties.”168  Although the Ohio Constitution allows a governor’s 
                                                                
159Id. 
160Id.  The committee was to make a report to the leaders of both the Senate and the House 
six months after the bill’s passage.  Id. 
161See thenewspaper.com, Ohio Senate Votes to Ban Speed Cameras, 
http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/14/1484.asp (calling the legislation an “effective ban” on 
speed cameras and noting that the bill would be sent to the House to approve the final 
version). 
162Wagner, supra note 141, at A1. 
163Id. 
164See, e.g. Jodi Andes, Taft Urged to put Stop to Red-light Camera Bill, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH, Dec. 13, 2006, at 1A (stating that Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman urged Taft to 
veto the bill).  
165Wagner, supra note 141, at A1. 
166See Provance, supra note 53 at A1 (“Officials in Toledo, Northwood, Columbus, 
Cleveland, and several other Ohio cities are hoping Gov. Bob Taft will stand up for the rights 
of local government when it comes to traffic enforcement cameras . . . .”).  Representative Jim 
Raussen, a major proponent of the bill stated, “[I]f we really want to make sure it’s about 
public safety, then let the study commission make recommendations to this body.”  Id.   
167Fields, supra note 141; see also Cummings, supra note 186. 
168Cummings, supra note 145.  Taft also stated, “I can discern no strong public policy that 
warrants this sweeping preemption of local control over our local streets.”  Jim Siegel & Mark 
Niquette, Taft Saves Red-light Cameras for Cities: Governor lets Ban on lead-paint lawsuits 
become Ohio Law, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 6, 2007, at 1A. 
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veto to be overridden by a three-fifths vote of both houses,169 the current legislature 
cannot override the veto because the bill was approved during the previous 
session.170  Representative Raussen stated that he would consider reintroducing the 
bill, however this is unlikely since a spokesman for incoming Governor Ted 
Strickland said that Strickland supported Taft’s decision.171  Therefore, it appears 
extremely unlikely that the Ohio Legislature will be able to ban the use of cameras, 
and opponents of the cameras will have to use different means to accomplish their 
goals.172 
E.  The Current Situation in The Ohio Courts 
Despite Governor Taft’s veto of House Bill 56, the fate of red-light and speeding 
cameras in Cleveland is still uncertain.  The Ohio Supreme Court has decided one 
case involving automated-camera systems; however they did not reach the 
constitutional issues of interest in this Note.173  In holding that the petitioners had not 
met the extraordinary requirements for a writ of prohibition, the court explained, “it 
is unclear whether [Cleveland’s Municipal Ordinance] conflicts with R.C. 
4521.05.”174  Another case, Mendenhall v. City of Akron, currently pending in the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio might force the Ohio 
Supreme Court to determine whether red-light cameras are legal under the Ohio 
Constitution.175  The case involves a challenge to the city of Akron’s Automated 
Mobile Speed Enforcement Systems.176  The plaintiffs assert that the use of cameras 
by the city violate both the Ohio Constitution and the United States Constitution.177  
In a Memorandum Opinion published on May 17, 2006, Judge David Dowd, Jr. 
found that Akron's ordinance authorizing civil penalties for camera violations was 
                                                                
169OHIO CONST. art. II, § 16. 
170Siegel & Niquette, supra note 168. 
171Fields, supra note 141 (“Strickland spokesman Keith Dailey said the new governor 
supports home rule and Taft’s decision.”). 
172See generally id.  
173See State ex rel. Scott v. City of Cleveland, 859 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ohio 2006) (holding 
that a  writ of prohibition against the city’s traffic-camera programs was not warranted by the 
circumstances).   
174Id. at 927. 
175See, e.g., John Higgins, Speed Cams are back in Court: Federal Judge asks Ohio 
Supreme Court to Rule on Correct Use, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 5, 2006 (“A federal judge has 
asked the Ohio Supreme Court to decide whether municipalities such as Akron can use 
automated cameras to issue civil fines for what Ohio law says are criminal traffic offenses).   
176Id. 
177See, Mendenhall v. City of Akron, No. 5:06CV139, No. 5:06CV154, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 30275, 9-10 (N.D. Ohio May 17, 2006).  In the stipulations of facts, the Court explains 
that Mendenhall is asserting a violation of her due process rights under the Ohio and United 
States Constitutions.  Id.  She is also asserting a claim that Akron’s ordinance allowing the use 
of these cameras violates the Home Rule Amendment to the Ohio Constitution.  Id.  This 
claim is premised on Mendenhall’s assertion that Ohio Revised Code Section 4511.07 is a 
general law, and thus, the Akron ordinance conflicts with it.  Id. 
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valid under the Ohio Constitution.178  The court did not rule on the plaintiffs' federal 
claims and allowed the parties to move forward with discovery to resolve the 
issues.179 
Two months after the Northern District's opinion, Judge John Straud of the 
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas found that a Girard, Ohio ordinance 
allowing red-light cameras did conflict with certain state traffic statutes.180  In light 
of the Trumbull County ruling, on November 30, 2006, Judge Dowd vacated the 
portion of his Memorandum Opinion that concluded that Akron’s ordinance was 
valid under the Ohio Constitution.181  Furthermore, the Judge certified the following 
question to the Ohio Supreme Court: “Whether a municipality has the power under 
home rule to enact civil penalties for the offense of violating a traffic signal light or 
for the offense of speeding, both of which are criminal offenses under the Ohio 
Revised Code.”182   
This answer to this question is will determine if Cleveland will continue to use 
photo enforcement cameras.183  As the court notes in Mendenhall, there are several 
challenges currently being litigated statewide concerning the use of these cameras.184  
The defendant’s preliminary memorandum on the certified question of law to the 
                                                                
178Id. at 20 (“[T]he Court finds that the many pronouncements of the Ohio Supreme Court 
stand for the proposition that in determining whether a municipal ordinance . . . is in ‘conflict’ 
with the general laws of Ohio, the test whether [is] whether the [] ordinance permits or 
licenses that which the Ohio statutes forbid and prohibit and vice versa.  In this case, the Court 
finds that the challenged ordinance neither permits or licenses that which the laws of the Ohio 
General Assembly either forbid or prohibit and vice versa.”). 
179Id. at 26-29 (stating that the court did have some concerns over possible federal due 
process and equal protection issues and therefore delayed ruling on defendants' motion for a 
judgment on the pleadings).  The court also denied plaintiff Mendenhall's motion to remand 
the case back to Common Pleas Court of Summit County.  Id. at 29. 
180Daniel Moadus, Jr. v. City of Girard, No. 05-CV-1927, 5 (Ct. Com. Pl. Trumbull 
County July 6, 2006) (stating that the Ohio “Legislature has authorized civil, non-criminal 
penalties to be set by municipalities for parking tickets).  The court noted that there had been 
no action by the State Legislature that would allow the extension of this policy to speeding.  
Id. at 7.  The court held the challenged ordinance to violate Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 
Ohio Constitution.  Id. 
181Mendenhall v. City of Akron, No. 5:06CV139, No. 5:06CV154, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
86843, 9-10 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2006) (“The Court has also come to the conclusion that, in 
view of the ruling by the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas in Moadus v. City of 
Girard, . . . it must VACATE that portion of the May 17, 2006 Memorandum Opinion 
wherein it concluded that the City of Akron has the power under Home Rule to adopt 
legislation calling for civil penalties for speeding violations detected by the automated system 
. . . .”). 
182Mendenhall v. City of Akron, No. 5:06CV139, No. 5:06CV154, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
86839, 3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 30, 2006) (The court noted that “[n]o controlling precedent of the 
Ohio Supreme Court answers this question, which is potentially dispositive of the two above-
captioned cases).   
183See Id. 
184Id. at 3 (noting that at least three similar lawsuits are currently being litigated in 
different courts around Ohio).   
20https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol55/iss4/10
2007] SPEEDING TOWARDS DISASTER 627 
Ohio Supreme Court notes that many of the lawsuits challenging camera 
enforcement have been stayed pending resolution of this question by the Ohio 
Supreme Court.185  The question is not easy, and involves almost a century of Ohio 
Supreme Court jurisprudence that has followed the enactment of Amendment XVIII 
to the Ohio Constitution.  This Paper urges the Ohio Supreme Court to conclude that 
municipal ordinances allowing speed and red-light cameras do conflict with the 
Home Rule Amendment. 
V.  HOME RULE ARGUMENT 
A.  Home Rule Under The Ohio Constitution 
In its 200-year history, the state of Ohio has had only two constitutions, with the 
current Constitution being ratified in 1851.186  In 1912, the people of Ohio amended 
their Constitution by adding article XVIII, commonly referred to as the Home Rule 
Amendment.187  The amendment came about due to the efforts of Progressives during 
the 1912 constitutional convention.188  Prior to the Amendment, municipalities could 
exercise only those powers that the Ohio General Assembly delegated to them.189  
The intention of those who drafted the Amendment was to accomplish three goals:  
1) to allow municipalities the option to have different forms of municipal 
organization; 2)  to give municipalities all the powers of local governance that did 
not conflict with the state’s general laws; and 3)  to define and expand municipal 
power in the operation of local utilities.190   
The second goal, considered the most difficult objective, is found in section three 
of the Amendment, which outlines the powers that municipal corporations have.  The 
section states: “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local 
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, 
sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.”191  It 
                                                                
185Memorandum of Defendants-Respondents The City of Akron and Nestor Traffic 
Systems, Inc. in Support of the Court’s Jurisdiction to Answer the Certified Question of Law 
at 7, Mendenhall v. City of Akron, No. 2006-2265 (Ohio Dec. 28, 2006) (“Indeed, several 
judges have stayed proceedings until there is a decision on the certified question by this 
Court.”).  The brief quotes an order by Judge Timothy McMonagle of the Cuyahoga County 
Court of Common Pleas in McNamara v. City of Cleveland.  Id.  McMonagle stated:  “The 
Court finds that the remaining issue in this case is identical to the question of law Certified to 
the Ohio Supreme Court on December 8, 2006, Case No. 06-2265.  Therefore, this case is 
hereby placed on the inactive docket.  The case may be reactivated only upon motion of a 
party after the Ohio Supreme Court issues a ruling in Case No. 06-2265.”  Id.  
186STEVEN H. STEINGLASS & GINO J. SCARSELLI, THE OHIO STATE CONSTITUTION: A 
REFERENCE GUIDE 1 (2004). 
187Id. at 327. 
188Id. 
189Id. 
190GEORGE D. VAUBEL, MUNICIPAL HOME RULE IN OHIO 14-15 (1978) (stating that these 
goals resulted from a compromise between those wanting the state to remain superior and 
those desiring that municipalities have complete sovereignty). 
191OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3. 
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“defines the relationship between municipal and state power” and gives a 
municipality the power to exercise its powers of self-government.192  This section is 
the most litigated of the Home Rule Amendment, and in the years following its 
adoption the Ohio Supreme Court has written many opinions explaining and 
applying the section.193   
B.  How Cleveland’s Traffic Cameras Violate Home Rule 
The Ohio Supreme Court in City of Canton v. State explained the three-part test 
used to determine when a local ordinance is void under the Home Rule 
Amendment.194  The court explained that: “[a] state statute takes precedence over a 
local ordinance when (1) the ordinance is in with the statute, (2) the ordinance is an 
exercise of the police power, rather than of local self-government, and (3) the statute 
is a general law.”195  In Village of Struthers v. Sokol, the Supreme Court explained 
the application of the first element, the “conflict” test.196  According to Sokol, an 
ordinance conflicts with a statute when “the ordinance permits or licenses that which 
the statute forbids and prohibits and vice versa.”197  This definition is the most widely 
cited; however, the Ohio Supreme Court has offered others.198  Under the second 
prong of the test, if a municipal ordinance is not an exercise of the police power, it is 
valid under the delegated power of local self-government.199  In order to constitute a 
                                                                
192Id. 
193OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3 (West 2006).  The editor’s comments to this compilation of 
the Ohio Constitution states that “[t]his section is and has been productive of much litigation 
to define its parameters.”  Id.  Much of the litigation involves determinations of what the 
various terms actually mean.  Id.   
194766 N.E.2d 963, 966 (Ohio 2002).  Canton involved a city code that prohibited the use 
of mobile homes as principal or accessory structures for residential use.  Id. at 965.  The city 
of Canton “amended its code to include ‘manufactured homes’ within the definition of ‘mobile 
homes,’” thus prohibiting manufactured homes within city limits.  Id.  However, the Ohio 
legislature had recently enacted a law that prohibited cities from banning manufactured 
homes.  Id.  The court held that the state law was not a general law, and struck it down for 
violating the home-rule provision of the Ohio Constitution.  Id. at 969.   
195Id. at 966. 
196Village of Struthers v. Sokol, 140 N.E. 519, 521 (Ohio 1923).  Sokol involved a 
municipal ordinance that prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquor.  Id. at 520.  The penalties 
provided by the state law were much more severe than those established by the ordinance.  Id. 
at 521.  Applying the test, the court held that the ordinances did not permit something that the 
state law prevented and vice versa, therefore the municipal ordinances were not in conflict 
with the state laws.  Id. at 522.   
197Id. 
198See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Betts, 154 N.E.2d 917, 919 (stating that the Struthers test 
is not exclusive).  The Court found that although the ordinance did not meet the definition 
from Struthers, it did “contravene the expressed policy of the state with respect to crimes by 
deliberately changing an act which constitutes a felony under state law into a misdemeanor, 
and this creates the kind of conflict contemplated by the Constitution.”  Id. at 919. 
199Village of Beachwood v. Bd. of Elections of Cuyahoga County, 148 N.E.2d 921, 923 
(Ohio 1958) (stating that if a local regulation affects only the municipality, it is within the 
municipality’s power of local self government). 
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general law under the third prong, the statute must “appl[y] to all parts of the state 
alike.”200  The municipality may still adopt and enforce a local ordinance that covers 
the same subject as a general law; it simply cannot adopt an ordinance that conflicts 
with the general law.201  
1.  Cleveland’s Ordinance Conflicts with the Traffic Statutes of the Ohio Revised 
Code      
    Under the Sokol test alone, Cleveland’s traffic cameras probably would not be 
found to conflict with the traffic statutes of the Ohio Revised Code.202  On their face, 
both the statutes and ordinances prohibit speeding.203  However, in a later case, the 
Ohio Supreme Court went beyond the Sokol test.  In Cleveland v. Betts the Court 
struck down an ordinance that made conduct a misdemeanor that the state statute 
ruled was a felony.204  The court began by reciting the Sokol test but then contended 
“surely this test is not exclusive.”205  Although there was no conflict under Sokol, the 
court determined that the ordinance did “contravene the expressed policy of the state 
with respect to crimes by deliberately changing an act which constitutes a felony 
under state law into a misdemeanor.”206  They then decided that this created the exact 
type of conflict that the Constitution forbids.207  With Cleveland’s ordinance, the 
conflict is even greater.  Cleveland takes action that the state says is criminal and 
turns it into a civil violation.208   
A case decided by the Mahoning County Court of Appeals used the Betts test to 
find conflict between an ordinance that made conduct criminal that the state law 
classified as a civil violation.209  It relied partly on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Niles v. Howard, which restated the Betts proposition that a law that changed an 
offense classified as a misdemeanor at state law to a felony at the municipal level 
was unconstitutional.210  Under Niles, a city ordinance that increased the penalty 
from a second to first-degree misdemeanor would be constitutional.  The Ohio 
                                                                
200Schneiderman v. Sesanstein, 167 N.E. 158, 159 (Ohio 1929). 
201Id.  
202Sokol, 140 N.E. at 521 
203Id. 




208See discussion supra Part III.B. 
209State v. Rosa, 128 Ohio App. 3d 556, 561 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
Youngstown’s deceptive acts or practices ordinance was unconstitutional). 
210466 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ohio 1984).  The court explained that “[I]f the Niles ordinance 
had altered the degree of punishment to a felony rather than a misdemeanor it would have 
been unconstitutional. However, since the ordinance only increased the penalty from a lesser 
misdemeanor to a first degree misdemeanor, it is not in conflict with the general laws of 
Ohio.”  Id. 
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Supreme Court has followed this distinction in prior cases.211  In Toledo v. Best, the 
court explained, “[w]here the only distinction between a state statute and a municipal 
ordinance, proscribing certain conduct and providing punishment therefore, is to the 
penalty only but not to the degree . . .  of the offense, the ordinance is not in conflict 
with the general law of the state.”212  Cleveland’s ordinances do not simply change 
the degree of the offense, they change the basic classification of an offense from 
criminal to civil.213  If a court found conflict between classifying a civil offense at 
state law as a criminal offense at the municipal level,214 the inverse should also be 
true and Cleveland’s ordinance conflicts with the Ohio Constitution. 
 The only traffic-related conduct that the State Legislature has authorized local 
authorities to penalize as civil infractions are parking violations under Chapter 4521 
of the Revised Code.215  The Legislature has not extended this practice to the 
enforcement of traffic violations, and in fact, the only bill to propose such an action 
failed to pass either house of the General Assembly.216  The logical inference that can 
be drawn is that the Legislature did not want to give local authorities the ability to 
enforce traffic violations civilly.217  Further support can be drawn from the fact that 
House Bill 56, which both houses did pass, did not allow for civil enforcement of 
moving traffic violations.218  It would only have allowed camera enforcement if a 
police officer personally witnessed the event and wrote the ticket.219   
 The conflict appears very clear when considering the purpose behind the 
Ohio Revised Code’s regulation of speeding offenses.220  The fact that the Ohio 
Revised Code makes speeding a criminal offense, and more importantly assesses 
points against an offender’s driving record, suggests that the purpose behind the 
statutes are to make the roads safer for Ohio drivers.221  A speeding or red-light 
violation, under the Revised Code, typically results in the assessment of two points 
to a driver’s record.222  If a person accumulates twelve points within a two-year 
                                                                
211See Toledo v. Best, 176 N.E.2d 520 (Ohio 1961). 
212Id. at 521. 
213See supra Part IV.B. 
214See Rosa, 128 Ohio App. 3d at 561. 
215See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4521.01-4521.10 (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (explaining the 
powers of local authorities in establishing parking ordinances). Section 4521.02 states that a 
local authority “may specify that a violation of the regulatory ordinance, resolution, or 
regulation shall not be considered a criminal offense for any purpose.”  Id. at § 4521.02.   
216See supra text accompanying Part IV C. (explaining that the General Assembly failed to 
pass Bill 241, which would have allowed municipalities to adopt civil enforcement of traffic 
violations).   
217This is an inference that the author has drawn.  There is no source indicating the reasons 
that House Bill did not pass. 
218See supra Part IV.C. 
219See supra Part IV.C. 
220See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21. 
221Id. 
222OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4510.036 (LEXISNEXIS 2006). 
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period, their license is suspended by the state223 for a period of six months.224  The 
obvious purpose of these statutes is to keep the roads safe from reckless drivers.225  
Civil enforcement of speeding or red-light offense by means of a camera system does 
little to make the roads safer, because it does not take violators off the road.226   
An established canon of statutory interpretation is expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius.  This rule of interpretation stands for the proposition that a statute “which 
provides that a thing shall be done in a certain way carries with it an implied 
prohibition against doing that thing in any other way.”227  In the absence of evidence 
of contrary legislative intent or policy, the method of enforcement listed in the 
statute is presumed to be exclusive.228  One treatise on statutory construction explains 
that “[l]egislative prescription of a specified sanction for noncompliance with 
statutory requirements has been held to exclude the application of other sanctions.”229  
The Ohio Supreme Court has applied this canon of statutory construction to home 
rule cases.230  Therefore, the court has accepted this canon of construction, and it can 
be applied to the Ohio Revised Code’s treatment of traffic offenses.231   
When this canon is applied to Ohio’s laws on speeding and red-light violations, it 
is clear that Cleveland’s traffic cameras conflict with the express will of the Ohio 
Legislature and violates the Ohio Constitution.  The fact that House Bill 241 (which 
would have allowed the use of traffic cameras) was not passed by the Ohio 
Legislature implies that legislators did not want to give municipalities the right to 
                                                                
223Id. § 4510.037 (stating that if a driver receives more than 12 points in a two year period, 
the registrar imposes a Class D suspension of his or her driver’s license).   
224Id. § 4510.02(B) (4) (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (stating that the period of time for a Class D 
suspension is six months). 
225Id. 
226Id. 
227NORMAN  J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ch. 46 (6th rev. ed., 
West 2000). 
228Id. at 314-15 (explaining that this rule is subordinate to the primary rule that it is the 
intent of the legislature which governs a statute’s interpretation). 
229Id. at 314. 
230See State ex rel. Paluf v. Feneli, 630 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ohio 1994).  This case involved 
a challenge to the Highland Heights City council’s refusal to confirm the mayor’s appointment 
of Mr. Paluf to the position of city law director.  Id. at 709.  The court of appeals had relied on 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius in holding that since the city’s charter specified that the 
law director be admitted to the practice of law in Ohio, the citizens expressed an intent that 
admittance to the practice of law be the only qualification necessary.  Id.  The court of appeals 
further held that the city council could only refuse an appointment to law director if the 
candidate was not admitted in Ohio.  Id.  The supreme court overturned the lower court’s 
decision and held that the city council could refuse confirmation of Paluf for reasons beyond 
the one specific requirement in the charter.  Id. at 712-13.  Although this case does not 
mention red light cameras or conflict between a state law and a municipal ordinance, it 
nonetheless signals the supreme court’s acceptance of this canon of constriction.  See 
generally id. 
231See generally id. 
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enforce traffic violations as a civil penalty.232  Furthermore, the bill that the Ohio 
Legislature actually passed, only to have it vetoed by the outgoing governor, 
provides evidence that the use of these cameras runs contrary to the desire of the 
state’s lawmakers.233  The O.R.C. explicitly states that speeding and red-light 
offenses should be criminal violations, and makes no mention of civil penalties for 
these offenses.234  The inclusion of these offenses as criminal violations for which 
points are to be assessed to an offender’s driving record, necessarily excludes civil 
enforcement.  In fact, the only offense for which the O.R.C. allows municipalities to 
enforce civilly, is parking violations.235  Only parking violations are able to be 
enforced civilly, thus red-light and speeding violations must be enforced as criminal 
violations.  Since Cleveland’s ordinance attempts to enforce red-light and speeding 
violations as civil offenses, it violated the express and implied pronouncement of the 
Ohio Legislature on the subject.  Thus, Cleveland’s ordinance is in conflict with the 
Ohio Revised Code, and therefore violates Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution. 
2.  Red-light Camera Ordinances are an Exercise of the Police Power by 
Municipalities.    
An important step in any home rule analysis is determining "whether the matter 
in question involves an exercise of local self-government or an exercise of local 
police power."236  In Village of Linndale v. State, the court noted that speeding laws 
were an exercise of the state’s police power.237  It is clear that Cleveland’s traffic 
cameras are an attempt to exercise the police power retained by the legislature of the 
state.238  Cleveland is attempting to regulate the safety of its citizens on the city’s 
streets and highways.239  This regulation of the police power would be valid if it did 
not conflict with the state’s traffic laws because, as noted in Linndale, municipalities 
can exercise their police power as long as there is no conflict between the statute and 
the ordinance.240  As explained above, there is conflict between the state laws and 
municipal ordinance.241  Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court should find Cleveland’s 
ordinance to be an unlawful exercise of the police power.242 
                                                                
232See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text. 
233See supra notes 145-63 and accompanying text. 
234See supra notes 127-28. 
235See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4521.01-4521.10 (LEXISNEXIS 2006) 
236Twinsburg v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 530 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ohio 1988).   
237706 N.E.2d 1227, 1229 (Ohio 1999) (holding that the state law and the municipal 
ordinance did not conflict, thus it was a valid exercise of the municipality’s police power).   
238See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
239See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
240706 N.E.2d at 1229. 
241See supra text accompanying notes 202-26. 
242See supra text accompanying notes 202-26. 
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3.  State Traffic Statutes are General Laws     
In Schneideman v. Sesanstein, the Ohio Supreme Court struck down a municipal 
speeding ordinance as conflicting with a section of the Ohio General Code.243  The 
court explained that general laws were enacted by the state legislature “to safeguard 
the peace, health, morals, and safety, and to protect the property of the people of the 
state.”244  The court explained that general laws apply uniformly to all parts of the 
state.245  Most importantly, the court held that Ohio laws regulating speed limits were 
general laws for purposes of the Home Rule Amendment.246  In a later case, the court 
held that as a rule of law  
[t]he words ‘general laws’ as set forth in Section 3 of Article XVIII of the 
Ohio Constitution means statutes setting forth police, sanitary or similar 
regulations and not statutes which purport only to grant or to limit the 
legislative powers of a municipal corporation to adopt or enforce police, 
sanitary or other regulations.247 
Under this definition, a state speeding law criminalizing speeding violations is a 
statute that sets forth police regulations.248  The key fact in support of this argument 
is that speeding violations are a crime under the Revised Code.249  Local authorities 
should be able to decide how to punish the crime, but should not be able to make 
speeding a civil offense.   
As the Trumbull County Court of Pleas explained in Moadus, “among the 
‘steadfast parameters’ [the Supreme Court] had established for determining when a 
law is a general law was that statutory schemes should be viewed ‘in their entirety, 
rather than a single statute in isolation,’ with an eye toward determining whether the 
statutes in question promoted ‘statewide uniformity.’”250  Viewed in their entirety, 
the statutes in the Ohio Revised Code regulating the enforcement of traffic violations 
                                                                
243167 N.E. 158, 161 (Ohio 1929) (holding that a municipal ordinance concerning speed 
limits was in conflict with a state law).   
244Id. at 159. 
245Id. (“They apply to all parts of the state alike.  Municipalities may adopt and enforce 
local regulations covering the same subject so long and so far as the same are not in conflict 
with general laws.”). 
246Id.  The court noted that the speeding laws were “safety regulations enacted in the 
interest of, and for the protection of, the public, and they definitely fix and prescribe the 
standard of care that must be exercised in the operation of automobiles throughout the state.”  
Id. 
247West Jefferson v. Robinson, 205 N.E.2d 382, paragraph three of the syllabus (Ohio 
1965) (holding that a state law that prohibited municipalities from requiring licenses to sell 
products was not a general law). 
248See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.21 (LEXISNEXIS 2006) (setting forth the speed 
limits applicable to various highways and state routes and mandating that points be assessed 
whenever a violation is more than five miles over the applicable speed limit).   
249Id. (explaining that a violation of this statute shall be classified as a misdemeanor).   
250Daniel Moadus, Jr. v. City of Girard, No. 05-CV-1927, 3 (Ct. Com. Pl. Trumbull 
County July 6, 2006) (quoting City of Canton v. State, 766 N.E.2d 963, 966-67 (Ohio 2002)). 
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are without question a matter of statewide authority.  They set up a uniform system 
of speed limits throughout the state and insist that violations of the statutes be 
punished as misdemeanors.251  The statutes governing traffic violations do not 
authorize the civil penalties.  Since the Code is so explicit about the regulation of 
traffic violations, it is difficult to make the argument that the City of Cleveland 
should be able to determine how they should be enforced.   
Last year, the Ohio Supreme Court handed down two important decisions on 
home rule.252  The first, American Financial Services Association v. Cleveland, found 
that a local ordinance that outlawed certain types of “predatory lending” violated the 
Ohio Constitution.253  The second decision, Cincinnati v. Baskin, found no conflict 
between a local ordinance on semi-automatic rifle possession and the state statute on 
the same subject.254  These decisions may help predict how the current court would 
handle a challenge to Cleveland’s traffic cameras.  In American Financial Services, 
the court dealt with a Cleveland ordinance that was stricter on predatory lending than 
the state statute.255  The court explained the rationale behind the statewide-concern 
doctrine and noted that a fundamental principle of Ohio law is that a municipality 
may not infringe on a matter of general statewide concern.256  The court further noted 
that the statewide concern doctrine falls within the second prong of the Canton 
test.257  The court concluded that the General Assembly had expressed its intent to 
preempt any municipal ordinances on predatory lending.258  The state’s statutes were 
                                                                
251Id. 
252Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006); Cincinnati v. Baskin, 
859 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio 2006). 
253858 N.E.2d at 790 (holding that the section of the Ohio Revised Code dealing with 
predatory lending expressly preempts local regulation of the practice). 
254859 N.E.2d at 519. 
255858 N.E.2d at 779.  The court explained that Ohio passed a law (O.R.C. 1.63) in 2002 
that required lenders to make certain disclosures to mortgagors on certain types of loans.  Id.  
Loans covered by the law had interest rates ten percentage points greater than the yield on 
Treasury securities or had pints and fees that exceed eight percent of the loan or $400.  Id.  
The Cleveland ordinance prohibited loans with an interest rate between four and a half and 
eight percentage points over Treasury securities and required balloon payments, excessive 
financing, and increasing interest rates.  Id.  The eight district court of appeals certified two 
questions to the Ohio Supreme Court:  “I: Whether R.C. 1.63 is a general law for purposes of 
Ohio’s home rule amendment.  II: Under a home rule analysis, whether local predatory 
lending ordinances that impose stricter requirements on lending transactions conflict with the 
state’s predatory lending statues.  Id. at 780. 
256Id. at 781.  The court noted that state power is “retained in those areas where a 
municipality would in no way be affected or where state dominance seemed to be required.”  
Id.  The question for Cleveland’s cameras is whether Ohio intended to retain this “exclusive 
state power.”  Id. 
257Id. at 782.  “[C]ourts should consider the doctrine when deciding whether ‘the 
ordinance is an exercise of local self government.”  Id. 
258Id. 
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found to be general laws, and Cleveland’s ordinances were in conflict and struck 
down by the court.259 
The court decided Baskin eighteen days later, upholding Cincinnati’s ordinance 
and distinguishing its decision in American Financial Services.260  The court began 
its analysis by nothing that the ordinances was an exercise of the police power, not 
local self-government, and therefore could be struck down if it conflicted with a 
general law.261  The court then established that the section of the O.R.C. in question 
was a general law because it “prescribes a rule of conduct upon citizens 
generally.”262  However, the court concluded that the statute was not in conflict under 
the Sokol test, because it did not prohibit what the state permits.263  Interestingly, 
neither case mentioned the test set forth in Betts.264  These cases will likely prove 
crucial to an Ohio Supreme Court decision on traffic cameras, because they are the 
court’s most recent statement on home rule. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, it is clear that the current use of traffic cameras 
by the City of Cleveland violates the Home Rule Amendment, and should therefore 
be struck down by the Ohio Supreme Court.  The three-prong test from Canton 
makes clear that they are unconstitutional.265  First, the ordinance conflicts with Ohio 
statutes because they change the entire nature of the offense.266  Instead of being a 
crime, and affording the accused the necessary rights under the constitution, the 
Cleveland’s ordinances turn an offense into a civil penalty.267  Examining the history 
of the red-light camera litigation in the General Assembly makes it clear that the 
legislature has manifested an intent to keep traffic violations as a criminal offense.268  
                                                                
259Id. at 784-86.  Ultimately, the court struck the ordinances down using the Sokol test 
because the ordinances sought to prohibit loans which the General Assembly had allowed.  Id. 
at 786. 
260Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ohio 2006) (explaining that Baskin is 
distinguishable because the Cincinnati ordinance did not regulate or prohibit conduct 
authorized by the state statute.  Id. 
261Id. at 516-17. 
262Id. at 517 (stating that the statute met the Canton definition of a general law).  
263Id. at 519 (“In the absence of any limiting provision or declaration to the contrary, we 
conclude that the General Assembly intended to allow municipalities to regulate the 
possession of lower-capacity semiautomatic firearms in accordance with local conditions . . . 
.”).  The court then state that the General Assembly only required that municipalities not allow 
possession of a semiautomatic firearm that could fire more than 31 rounds without reloading.  
Id.   
264See generally Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. Cleveland, 858 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 2006); 
Cincinnati v. Baskin, 859 N.E.2d 514 (Ohio 2006) (nowhere in either opinion is the Betts test 
mentioned). 
265Canton, 766 N.E.2d at 966. 
266See supra text accompanying notes 202-26. 
267See supra text accompanying notes 129-38. 
268See supra text accompanying notes 139-72. 
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It decided against passing legislation that would have allowed for civil enforcement 
of traffic violation.269  Furthermore, it has only allowed civil enforcement of motor 
vehicle laws in the area of parking laws.270  Under the second prong from Canton, 
speed limits and traffic violations are clearly within the police power of the state.271  
Finally, under the third prong of Canton, the traffic statutes of the Ohio Revised 
Code are general laws.272  For these reasons, the Ohio Supreme Court should find 
that municipal camera ordinances are unconstitutional in Ohio. 
The City of Cleveland has a couple of options to deal with the problem raised by 
this Note.  One option would be simply to rid the city of its traffic cameras.  Instead 
of relying on cameras to generate revenue for the city’s budget gap, the city’s 
administration could focus on developing alternative ways to raise revenue.  This is 
what Councilman Joe Cimperman originally suggested when the camera program 
was proposed.273  This proactive approach would be the best option, because it would 
demonstrate to the citizens of Cleveland that the government is addressing their 
budgetary problems head-on and trying to find real solutions.  Another option might 
be to allow Cleveland’s voters to decide whether or not to retain the cameras in their 
municipality, as the City of Steubenville, Ohio did this past November.274  An 
overwhelming 76.2% of the town's citizens voted to ban the use of red-light cameras 
in the town, following the trend of voters nationwide.275  In fact, any time a 
municipality in the United States has been asked to vote on the use of camera 
enforcement, the bill has been defeated.276  A final option would be simply to wait 
until the Ohio Supreme Court hands answers the certified question from Mendenhall.  
As this Note attempts to demonstrate, the relevant authority should lead the court to 
conclude that traffic cameras violate the Home Rule Amendment of the Ohio 
Constitution.  This option would be the worst approach, because it would suggest an 
inflexible city government that is slow to react and unoriginal in solving its 
budgetary problems.  Whichever option Cleveland takes, it is clear that its traffic 
cameras violate the Ohio Constitution and must be removed. 
                                                                
269See supra text accompanying notes 139-44. 
270See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4521.01-4521.10 (LEXISNEXIS 2006). 
271See supra text accompanying notes 236-42. 
272See supra text accompanying notes 243-64. 
273See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
274See thenewspaper.com, Steubenville, Ohio Voters to Decide Speed Camera Fate, 
http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/14/1411.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (stating that “[a] 
'Yes' vote on Measure Ten will allow speed cameras to continue ticketing motorists and a 'No' 
vote will cause the devices to be removed.”).  
275See thenewspaper.com, Steubenville, Ohio Voters Overwhelmingly Reject Speed 
Cameras: Steubenville, Ohio becomes the fourth US community that has voted on and rejected 
photo radar, http://www.thenewspaper.com/news/14/1433.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2007) 
(stating that the town's voters rejected against photo enforcement in a referendum on the city's 
camera program). 
276Id. (stating that Steubenville is the fourth municipality nationwide to vote against 
camera enforcement).  The other cities are Batavia, Illinois; Peoria, Arizona; and Anchorage, 
Alaska.  Id. 
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